To help explain its deep slump, General Motors Corp. often cites
"legacy costs," including pensions for its giant U.S. work
force. In its latest annual report, GM wrote: "Our extensive pension
and [post-employment] obligations to retirees are a competitive
disadvantage for us." Early this year, GM announced it was ending
pensions for 42,000 workers.
![[pension]](../../../../site_images/penswi2.gif)
But
there's a twist to the auto maker's pension situation: The pension plans
for its rank-and-file U.S. workers are overstuffed with cash, containing
about $9 billion more than is needed to meet their obligations for years
to come.
Another
of GM's pension programs, however, saddles the company with a liability of
$1.4 billion. These pensions are for its executives.
This
is the pension squeeze companies aren't talking about: Even as many
reduce, freeze or eliminate pensions for workers -- complaining of the
costs -- their executives are building up ever-bigger pensions, causing
the companies' financial obligations for them to balloon.
Companies
disclose little about any of this. But a Wall Street Journal analysis of
corporate filings reveals that executive benefits are playing a large and
hidden role in the declining health of America's pensions. Among the
findings:
• Boosted
by surging pay and rich formulas, executive pension obligations exceed $1
billion at some companies. Besides GM, they include General Electric
Co. (a $3.5 billion liability); AT&T Inc. ($1.8 billion); Exxon
Mobil Corp. and International Business Machines Corp. (about
$1.3 billion each); and Bank of America Corp. and Pfizer
Inc. (about $1.1 billion apiece).
• Benefits for executives now
account for a significant share of pension obligations in the U.S., an
average of 8% at the companies above. Sometimes a company's obligation for
a single executive's pension approaches $100 million.
• These liabilities are largely
hidden, because corporations don't distinguish them from overall pension
obligations in their federal financial filings.
• As a result, the savings that
companies make by curtailing pensions for regular retirees -- which have
totaled billions of dollars in recent years -- can mask a rising cost of
benefits for executives.
• Executive pensions, even when
they won't be paid till years from now, drag down earnings today. And they
do so in a way that's disproportionate to their size, because they aren't
funded with dedicated assets.
One
reason executive pensions have grown so large is that they are linked to
ballooning overall executive compensation. Companies often design
retirement payouts to replace a percentage of what a person earns while
active.
But
for executives, the percentage of pay replaced is itself higher.
Compensation committees often aim for a pension that replaces 60% to 100%
of a top executive's compensation. It's 20% to 35% for lower-level
employees.
David
Dorman was chief executive of AT&T Corp. from 2002 until its merger
with SBC Communications in November. He left in January. His total of five
years at AT&T earned him a yearly pension of $2.1 million. That will
replace 60% of his annual salary and bonus in his final three years.
By
contrast, former AT&T accountant Ralph Colotti's $28,800 annual
pension replaces 33% of his final pay. He was at the company for 33 years.
Mr.
Colotti's pension was held down by a change AT&T made in 1998 in the
formula used to calculate pensions. The switch had the effect of freezing
pension growth for older workers like him. The 55-year-old now works at
another company with a pension plan.
"Working
here another 10 years won't make up for what my old pension would have
been" without AT&T's change in formula, he said.
AT&T
described its retirement benefits as excellent and said a pension on the
scale of Mr. Colotti's is good in the telecommunications industry. Mr.
Dorman's richer deal is "reasonable, customary and comparable to what
similarly sized companies offer," AT&T said. A spokeswoman noted
that "in any industry, senior executives are almost always provided
with enhanced levels of benefits as a way to recruit and retain the best
talent and the best leadership possible to lead the company."
In
percentage of pay replaced, Pfizer's chairman and CEO, Henry McKinnell,
does best of all. His future $6.5 million-a-year pension will replace 100%
of his current salary and bonus.
Cutting
Back
Even
as executives' pensions grow, many companies are curtailing those for the
rank and file. In one move, hundreds of employers, including Boeing
Co., Xerox Corp. and Electronic Data Systems Corp., have
switched to pension formulas known as "cash balance" plans. One
effect is to slow the growth of older workers' pensions or halt it
altogether. That's what happened to Mr. Colotti at AT&T.
Other
companies, including Verizon Communications Inc., Unisys
Corp. and Sears Holdings Corp., are freezing their pension plans
for some workers. A freeze leaves intact pensions already earned but
prevents any further growth during a worker's career.
Some
employers have added pensions for executives at about the same time as
they limited those for others. McKesson Corp. established a special
pension plan for its executives in 1995 and froze those of other workers
two years later. McKesson didn't respond to requests for comment.
Allied
Waste Industries Inc. froze pensions for certain salaried workers in
1999. Among those affected was Brad Green, then a safety official at a
business Allied Waste had acquired. Although he never expected his pension
to be big, said Mr. Green, 45, the freeze meant any future growth
"was basically just wiped out with the stroke of a pen."
Four
years later, Allied adopted a pension plan that covers 10 executives. It
did so "to provide a competitive recruitment and retention
benefit," said Allied's treasurer, Michael Burnett. He noted that the
plan that was frozen had come from a company Allied acquired.
Mr.
Burnett added that all employees have a 401(k), a savings plan to which
they can contribute from their own earnings. Many companies, including
Allied, match part of employee contributions.
Companies
that restrict regular pension plans often point to the 401(k), some noting
that they've enhanced their match of contributions. Unlike pension plans,
401(k) plans don't create a corporate debt or liability, since employees
provide most of the assets and firms are typically free to halt any
contributions of their own.
Companies
generally are also free to alter, freeze or end regular employees' pension
plans, unless a union contract is involved. But executive pensions often
are protected from management interference by employment or other
contracts.
By
curtailing pensions for regular workers, large companies have reduced
pension obligations to them by billions of dollars in recent years. So
pension obligations to regular workers are stable or shrinking at many
companies while those for executives
rise.
At BellSouth Corp., for example, the obligations for pensions for
ordinary workers have edged down 3% since 2000. The liability for pensions
for executives is up 89% over the same period. A BellSouth spokesman noted
that, like many executive pensions, the benefit could be lost in the event
the company becomes insolvent.
The
promise of any pension becomes a corporate obligation. Although the
payments are in the future, the promise means the company has a liability
now. And a number can be put on it.
Figuring
the Bill
Pfizer's
promise to pay Mr. McKinnell $6.5 million a year for life in retirement
equals an $83 million liability for Pfizer today, federal filings by the
drug maker show. Pfizer defends Mr. McKinnell's pension as fair.
When
Edward Whitacre, chairman and CEO of AT&T Inc., turns 65 in November,
he'll be entitled to a pension of $5.4 million a year for life, plus an
$18.8 million lump sum. For this, AT&T's liability today is $84.4
million, according to an actuarial estimate done for the Journal by Katt
& Co. of Mattawan, Mich. AT&T said Mr.
Whitacre's
pension reflects four decades of service and 15 years of "very, very
strong and visionary management" as chief of the company, which was
called SBC much of that time.
UnitedHealth
Group Inc. Chairman and CEO William McGuire will get a $5.1 million
annual pension after he retires, plus a further $6.4 million at
retirement. The result is a UnitedHealth liability of about $90 million,
according to two actuaries. UnitedHealth declined to comment on their
estimate. In the wake of recent criticism of Dr. McGuire's pay -- which
includes $1.6 billion in unrealized stock-option gains as of the end of
last year -- the managed-care company has capped his pension benefit, a
spokeswoman said.
Pension
Pyramid
Companies
sometimes offer several tiers of pensions for the highly paid. The
structure at IBM illustrates this.
Its
chairman and CEO, Samuel Palmisano, is due a yearly pension of about $4.7
million in retirement after age 60. He's now 54. IBM's liability today for
this is about $50.3 million, according to an estimate by Katt & Co.
Another
IBM pension plan, which last year covered eligible executives earning
$351,000 or more, had a $204 million liability at year-end, company
filings show. And for a third plan covering a broader group of the
well-paid, IBM had obligations totaling $1.1 billion. IBM declined to say
how many are covered by these plans, saying only that it is
"thousands."
To
put the figures in perspective: The liability for IBM's regular U.S.
pension plan, covering 254,000 workers and retirees, was $46.4 billion at
the end of 2005.
An
IBM spokesman described the estimate of its liability for Mr. Palmisano's
pension as high but declined to provide another figure. He said Mr.
Palmisano's pension from 32 years at the company will replace about 45% of
his compensation, which the spokesman called below average for heads of
major companies.
A result of these
trends is that executive pensions make up a significant portion of total
pension liabilities at many companies: 12% at Exxon Mobil and Pfizer; 9%
at Metlife Inc. and Bank of America; 19% at Federated Department
Stores Inc.; 58% at insurer Aflac Inc.
At some companies, the only people who have
pensions at all are executives. At Nordstrom Inc., the nearly
30,000 ordinary employees don't get pensions. But 45 executives do.
Another retailer, Dillard's Inc., also provides pensions only to
certain officers. Neither had any comment.
Companies' retirement liabilities for their
executives have also grown through another little-noticed trend: Over
recent years, an increasing portion of executives' pay has been postponed,
via pension and deferred-compensation plans, rather than given in current
paychecks. (See
adjoining article2.)
Out
of Sight
Even if a company's liability for executives'
pensions totals hundreds of millions of dollars, its employees and
shareholders may never know. Companies don't have to report this
obligation separately in federal financial filings. A few specify it in a
footnote, and some provide clues that make it possible to derive the
figure.
The minimal disclosure dates from the late
1980s, when companies first were required to report pension liabilities
but were allowed to aggregate all of them. At the time, distinguishing
executive pensions was less of an issue because they were smaller. When
they ballooned along with executive pay in the 1990s and 2000s, the rules
didn't change. Most employers have continued to blend pension figures
together. Wall Street Journal publisher Dow Jones & Co. said it
hasn't broken out executive-pension figures but will "re-examine
whether to do so going forward."
When they do mention executive pensions in
filings, companies often use terms that only pension-industry insiders
would recognize. Time Warner Inc.'s filings include -- as part of a
category called "other, primarily general and administrative
obligations" -- a footnote reference to "unfunded defined
benefit pension plans." Those are executive pensions.
Lumping pensions together can also give a false
impression of the security of ordinary workers' plan. Someone browsing
Time Warner's filings might think its pensions for regular employees were
underfunded by 7%. This impression would be illusory. The pension plan for
regular Time Warner employees has more assets set aside in it than the
plan needs to pay benefits well into the future. The shortfall is due
entirely to a plan for highly paid employees. That one has a $305 million
unfunded liability.
A spokeswoman for Time Warner said the
company's elite pensions cover more than just a small number of top
executives but declined to say how many. She said Time Warner goes
"to great lengths to make complex information accessible to the
average investor."
A
Debt and Its Cost
Perhaps the most significant effect of the
limited disclosure is to make it difficult, or impossible, to evaluate
company statements about their retirement burdens and the need to cut
benefits. To see this, it's necessary to understand a bit about how
pensions are accounted for.
Pension plans, whether for executives or for
others, are obligations to pay. In other words, they're debts. And like
any debt, they have what amounts to a carrying cost. That carrying cost is
part of a company's pension expense.
In the case of pensions for regular employees,
the expense is partly or wholly offset by investment returns on money the
company set aside in the pension plan when it "funded" it.
Executive pension plans are different. They're
normally left unfunded. They have no assets set aside in them. That means
there is no investment income to blunt the expense. The result is that
obligations for executive pensions create far more expense for an
employer, dollar-for-dollar, than pensions for regular workers.
A company's pension expense is something it has
to subtract from its earnings each quarter. The cost of executive
pensions, having no investment income to cushion it, hits the bottom line
with full force.
An
Outsize Impact
In Pfizer's overall U.S. pension obligation of
about $9 billion, executive pensions account for about one dollar in
eight. Yet the pension expense they generate is proportionately far larger
-- equal to more than half as much as that from pensions for regular
employees and retirees, who are much more numerous. The executive plans
cover 4,200 people. The regular plans cover more than 100,000. Pfizer had
no comment on this.
At AT&T Inc., the pension liability for
executives was a modest 3.8% of the company's total pension obligation at
the end of last year. Yet these promises to 1,000 or so highly paid people
generated more than 45% of AT&T's pension expense. The expense for
them came to $113 million last year, and reduced AT&T's 2005 earnings
by that amount.
The other 55% of pension expense? It covered
189,000 regular employees.
AT&T's controller, John Stephens, confirmed
that executive pensions cause a bigger drag on earnings, per dollar of
liability, than pensions for others. He added that AT&T, like some
other companies, has informally earmarked an undisclosed amount of assets
for paying executive pensions in the future. But while these assets earn
investment returns, they don't lower pension expense, because the assets
aren't irrevocably dedicated to this purpose. The executive pension plan,
in other words, isn't funded.
Why don't companies just fund executive
pensions? Chalk it up to taxes. Contributions that companies make to
regular pension plans are tax-deductible and grow tax-free. Congress set
that rule to encourage employers to provide pensions for the rank and
file. But a company that contributes assets to an executive pension plan
gets no tax break. In fact, there's a tax penalty: Money contributed to
such a plan is considered current compensation to the executives, and they
owe personal taxes for it.
There's often another reason executive pensions
are more costly. The expense of regular pensions can be offset not just by
investment returns on the assets but also by gains that result when
companies cut benefits.
Cutting a benefit naturally cancels part of an
employer's liability. Under accounting rules, a canceled liability equates
to a gain. That gain reduces pension expense from the regular workers'
plan. So thanks both to investment returns and to gains from cutting
benefits, regular pension plans are less costly than those for executives.
Whose
Expense?
These accounting effects may sound technical
but they matter, because companies that curtail ordinary workers' benefits
often cite their pension "costs" or "expense" as the
reason.
In January, IBM said it will freeze the
pensions of all U.S. employees and executives. The move reduced its
pension liability by $775 million. IBM cited pension costs, volatility,
and unpredictability. It didn't mention that a quarter of its U.S. pension
expense last year resulted from pensions for several thousand of its
highest-paid people.
The numbers: $134 million of pension expense
was for the well-paid; $381 million was for all active and retired
employees, more than a quarter of a million people. An IBM spokesman
confirmed the numbers but said the expense for its executive plans came to
only about 1% of pretax earnings from continuing operations.
Lucent Technologies Inc. has pointed to
retiree benefits as a burden and has cut benefits in a number of ways. For
instance, for various retirees in recent years, Lucent has used a
less-generous pension formula; eliminated dental and spousal medical
coverage and death benefits; and raised retiree health-insurance premiums.
In a recent filing, the Murray Hill, N.J., telecom-equipment firm said,
"Lucent's pension and postretirement benefits plans are large...and
also costly."
Yet the pension plans for regular Lucent
employees and retirees, who number about 230,000, are overfunded. In fact,
they're so full of cash that the investment return on their assets not
only erases the pension plan's expense -- it adds to earnings. In the
fiscal year ended last Sept. 30, these pension-plan assets pumped $973
million into Lucent's bottom line, accounting for about 82% of the
company's profit.
They would have pumped in still more, save for
an unfunded pension plan for Lucent's highest-paid people, which had a
liability of approximately $422 million last year. Lucent confirmed that
pensions for its executives and those earning more than $210,000 in 2005
reduced net income. It declined to say by how much. A spokeswoman said
Lucent follows U.S. pension accounting and disclosure rules and that if
the expense for retiree medical plans were subtracted, its overall
retirement benefits contributed $718 million to income.
GM's
Retirees
When General Motors cites retiree costs, the
giant auto maker has a point: It owed nearly 700,000 U.S. workers and
retirees pensions that totaled $87.8 billion at the end of last year.
But $95.3 billion had already been set aside to
pay those benefits when due.
All of these assets are earning investment
returns, which offset the pensions' expense. GM lost $10.6 billion in
2005. But deep as its losses have been, they would have been far worse
without the more than $10 billion per year in investment income that the
GM pension plan for the rank and file generates.
The pension plan for GM executives is another
matter. Unfunded to the tune of $1.4 billion, it detracts from GM's bottom
line each year.
Just how much is a mystery, because GM doesn't
break out the figure. It said executive pensions are "a very small
portion of our overall expense" but declined to give the figure.
Earlier this year, GM announced it would freeze
the pensions of its 42,000 salaried workers starting next January, as well
as of those 5,200 highly paid employees. The freeze of the executive
pensions will cut GM's pension liability by $60 million, while its freeze
of salaried workers will yield a far bigger reduction, $1.6 billion.
A spokeswoman for GM said its concerns about
its pension plans have eased, though the company remains concerned about
retiree health-care costs. With the pension freeze and improved returns on
its pension assets, including billions of dollars GM has contributed to
the plans in recent years, "I would say pension really is not a
problem any more," the spokeswoman said. She said that GM has no
fixed obligation to pay the executive benefits and could renege at any
time, although she called such a move unlikely.
GM has often said its U.S. pension plans added
about $800 to the cost of each car made in the U.S. in 2004. It declines
to say how much was due to executive pensions.